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Abstract
An unknown positive number of items arrive at independent uni-
formly distributed times in the interval [0, 1] to a selector, whose task
is to pick online the last one. We show that under the assump-
tion of an adversary determining the number of items, there exists
a game-theoretical equilibrium, in other words the selector and the
adversary both possess optimal strategies. The probability of success
of the selector with the optimal strategy is estimated numerically to
0.352917000207196.
1 Introduction
An unknown number n ≥ 1 of items are presented at independent uniformly
distributed times in the interval [0, 1] to a selector, whose task is to choose
online the last one. This is related to so-called parking and house-selling
problems in the theory of optimal stopping, but has a more adversarial flavor.
The problem was originally motivated by a generalization of the secretary
problem to partially ordered sets (which we discuss in Section 5), but in view
of the simplicity seemed worthy of study in its own right.
We begin with some observations showing that the probability of success
with a good strategy is a nontrivial constant. In Section 3 we show that both
the selector and the adversary possess optimal strategies. In Section 4 we
show how to compute numerically the probability of success for the selector
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at game-theoretical equilibrium. Finally in Section 5 we explain the origin
of the problem and its relation to the partially ordered secretary problem.
Acknowledgments. This paper has grown out of discussions in coffee
breaks at conferences in the last ten years. I wish to thank in particular
David Aldous, Thomas Bruss, Ragnar Freij, Svante Janson, Joel Spencer
and Peter Winkler.
2 Basic observations
Starting from the selector’s point of view, we wish to maximize the probabil-
ity of picking the last item under a worst-case scenario. We first give a simple
proof that there is a strategy for the selector that achieves a probability of
success bounded away from zero.
Proposition 2.1. There is a strategy by which the selector succeeds with
probability at least some constant c > 0 for every n.
Proof. The selector starts by observing the number k of items arriving in
[0, 1/2]. The idea is to estimate the total number of items to roughly 2k,
in which case the remaining arrival times can be approximated by a Poisson
point process of rate 2k. In particular we expect that with probability roughly
1/e, the interval [1 − 1/(2k), 1] will contain exactly one item. Our strategy
is therefore to wait until time 1− 1/(2k) and accept the next one.
Since we do not have an a priori probability distribution on n, we cannot
talk about the probability distribution of n conditioning on k. Instead we
must fix the selector’s strategy and analyze it for arbitrary n. With the
trivial modification of accepting the first item if k = 0, the strategy will
clearly achieve positive probability of success for each n, and therefore it
suffices to analyze it for large n.
For ǫ > 0 we have, by the law of large numbers,(
1
2
− ǫ
)
n < k <
(
1
2
+ ǫ
)
n (1)
with high probability as n→∞. Conditioning on k and supposing that (1)
holds, the probability that exactly one of the remaining n− k items arrives
after time 1− 1/(2k) is
(n− k) ·
1
k
·
(
1−
1
k
)n−k−1
= (1 +O(ǫ)) · e−1.
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Therefore as n → ∞, the probability of success will converge to 1/e,
which establishes the claim.
Thomas Bruss has pointed out that the odds-algorithm [1, 2] provides
a quite good heuristic for the selector. Although the criteria of the main
theorem of [1] are not met, it suggests a strategy which accepts the k:th
item if it arrives after time 1 − 1/(k + 1). This strategy gives a success
probability of at least 5/16, the minimum occurring for n = 3, but we have
no computation-free proof of this.
The proof we have given here of Proposition 2.1 essentially reduces the
problem to choosing online the last event of a Poisson process of known rate.
The idea of treating the arrival times as a Poisson point process also forms
the basis for an informal argument that shows (in a way which can be made
rigorous) that the selector cannot achieve uniformly in n a better success
probability than 1/e.
We think of the number n as chosen by an adversary, the devil. The devil
can choose n from any probability distribution, and in particular may choose
n according to Poisson(λ)-distribution. This means that the arrival times
will be the times of the events in a rate λ Poisson point process on [0, 1].
There is a small technicality to resolve: The devil is strictly not allowed to
choose n = 0, but we can modify the rules of the game so that the selector
wins by default if n = 0.
The selector wins by default with probability e−λ, and must otherwise
choose online the last event of the Poisson process whose rate λ we can
even assume to be known to the selector. We will present a more general
argument in detail later, but for the moment let us assume that the only
reasonable thing the selector can do is to choose a point in time and decide
to accept the next item. Then the selector wins if the number of remaining
items is exactly 1. If the expected number of remaining items is x, then the
probability of exactly one is xe−x, which attains a maximum of 1/e for x = 1.
If our assumption about the strategy of the selector is correct, the devil can
therefore keep the selector’s winning probability below any number which is
greater than 1/e.
At this point we present an erroneous argument which pretends to demon-
strate that, as for the classical secretary problem as well as the setting of [1],
a success probability of 1/e is achievable. This caused me some confusion,
especially at the point when another argument seemed to establish the op-
posite. The way it is presented here the argument lacks rigor in several
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respects, but as we will later see, the frivolous assumption of the existence of
a game-theoretical equilibrium is not the most serious issue. Although incor-
rect, the argument may be of some interest as it reveals a certain paradoxical
nature of the problem. I apologize to readers who are unable to follow it,
but explaining it in greater detail is actually impossible.
Erroneous Conclusion 2.2. There is a strategy for the selector that suc-
ceeds with probability at least 1/e regardless of n.
“Proof”. First observe that an optimal strategy for the devil cannot be to
choose n from a distribution with finite support. If it were, then the selector’s
optimal strategy would always accept the N :th item, where N is the largest
value of n chosen with positive probability. But then the devil could switch
strategy and instead choose n = N + 1 and always win.
Hence the devil will choose arbitrarily large values of n with positive prob-
ability. But if n is large, the strategy described in the proof of Proposition 2.1
will achieve winning probability tending to 1/e. Since at game-theoretical
equilibrium, all values of n in the devil’s strategy must be equally likely to
win, the selector’s winning probability must be at least 1/e.
After this introduction, where our arguments have deteriorated from sub-
optimal to non-rigorous to incorrect, let us start over again and be more
careful.
3 Existence of optimal strategies
3.1 A card game
We wish to apply the von Neumann-Morgenstern equilibrium theorem, and
therefore start by studying a similar game where each player has only finitely
many pure strategies.
In this game there is a deck of d cards, and at the start of the game the
devil labels the face side of some of them (labels representing items). There
must be at least one labeled card, and at most N . The deck is then shuffled
and the cards are turned up one by one. The selector, knowing d and N ,
must select online the last labeled card.
The card game has only finitely many pure strategies for each of the play-
ers, and therefore by the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem has a strategic
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equilibrium. Next we establish some properties of the equilibrium strategies.
We assume throughout that d ≥ N . Notice that the devil’s strategy is simply
a probability distribution on {1, . . . , N}.
Lemma 3.1. At any equilibrium in the card game, the devil’s strategy gives
positive probability to each of the numbers 1, . . . , N .
Proof. First notice that at equilibrium, the selector must win with positive
probability, since there is a trivial strategy that wins with probability 1/N :
Just make a guess on the number of labeled cards from uniform distribution
on {1, . . . , N}.
It follows that at equilibrium, the selector’s strategy must have the prop-
erty that for every k ≤ N , it may happen that the k:th labeled card is
accepted. By this we mean that there is some sequence of cards for which
with positive probability the selector’s strategy accepts the k:th labeled card,
but no earlier labeled card. If the selector’s strategy didn’t have this prop-
erty, then the devil could switch to a strategy of always choosing exactly k
labeled cards, which would then win with probability 1.
Now suppose for a contradiction that at an equilibrium, the devil’s strat-
egy gives probability 0 to some number k ≤ N . We want to show that the
selector can change strategy and strictly increase his winning chances. There
are two cases: If there is some number greater than k which is chosen by the
devil with positive probability, then let l be the smallest such number. The
change of strategy will consist in never accepting the k:th labeled card, and
instead (whenever the original strategy dictated accepting the k:th labeled
card) waiting for the l:th labeled card and accept that.
If on the other hand there is no number greater than k which is chosen
by the devil with positive probability, then let m < k be the largest number
which is. The change of strategy will now consist in always accepting the
m:th labeled card. Since the original strategy sometimes waits for the k:th
labeled card, this will give a strictly increased winning probability.
Contrary to assumption we are not at equilibrium, and this contradiction
establishes the claim.
Corollary 3.2. At any equilibrium in the card game, the selector’s strategy
has the property that it wins with the same probability for all n = 1, . . . , N .
We can assume without changing the players’ winning chances that the
selector, when deciding on the action on a labeled card, can take into account
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only the number of cards drawn earlier and the number of labeled cards
among them, but not the actual positions (times) of the earlier labeled cards.
The selector’s strategy can then be described by functions f1, . . . , fN , where
fk : {k, . . . , m} → [0, 1], describes the probability fk(i) of accepting the k:th
labeled card if it arrives as the i:th card turned up.
The next lemma shows that at equilibrium, each fk will have a sharp
transition from 0 to 1 going via at most one value strictly between 0 and 1.
Lemma 3.3. For 1 ≤ k ≤ N and k ≤ i < m, if fk(i) > 0, then fk(i+1) = 1.
Proof. If k = N then fk must be identically 1 since by Corollary 3.2 the
selector’s strategy must optimize the winning chances against each possible
value of n.
Suppose therefore that k < N and assume that fk(i) > 0. Then, having
fixed the devil’s strategy and optimizing for the selector, accepting the k:th
labeled card at position i is either better than rejecting, or indifferent. Since
k < N , there is a positive probability that card i+ 1 is labeled. If it is, then
the selector will have positive probability of winning if card i is rejected, but
obviously zero probability of winning if card i is accepted. Conditioning on
card i + 1 being labeled, the selector is strictly better off rejecting card i
than accepting. Therefore conditioning on card i + 1 not being labeled, the
selector is strictly better off accepting card i than rejecting it. Now observe
that the situation after drawing the k:th labeled card as card i, conditioning
on card i + 1 not being labeled, is the same as if drawing the k:th labeled
card as card i+ 1.
This shows that the selector must strictly prefer accepting the k:th card
in position i+ 1 over rejecting it, which implies that fk(i+ 1) = 1.
3.2 Reducing the original game to the card game
We wish to draw conclusions about the original game, which in the following
we call the last-arrival game, from the analysis of the card game. Starting
from the last-arrival game, the following is a sequence of games that become
more and more advantageous to the selector:
(1) We choose a number N and restrict the devil’s choices to 1 ≤ n ≤ N .
(2) We choose a number d and divide the unit interval into d equal time-
slots. We allow the selector to wait until the end of the current time-slot
before deciding whether to accept a newly arrived item.
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(3) Moreover, we decide that the selector wins by default if any two items
arrive in the same time-slot (even if the selector had previously accepted
an item).
(4) Instead, we first generate N independent arrival times t1, . . . , tN and
declare the selector winner if any two of those fall in the same time-slot.
If not, then after the devil chooses a number n, a random subset of n
of the times t1, . . . , tN are chosen as arrival times of the n items.
(5) Before the game, a biased coin is flipped, and with probability
(
N
2
)
/d,
the selector is declared winner. If not, then the (N, d)-card game is
played.
Notice that
(
N
2
)
/d is an over-estimate of the probability that two of the
numbers t1, . . . , tN fall in the same time-slot. Moreover, conditioning on no
such collision will reduce the game (4) to the card game.
3.3 The restricted game
The game in (1) above, which is continuous time but with the devil’s choices
restricted to n ≤ N will be called the N-restricted game. By a threshold
strategy for the selector, we mean a strategy given by a sequence a1, . . . , aN ,
where the k:th item is accepted if and only if it arrives after time ak.
Proposition 3.4. For every N , there is a threshold strategy which is optimal
for the selector in the N-restricted game.
Proof. We think of N as fixed throughout the argument. Lemma 3.3 shows
that for each d, the (N, d)-card game can be played optimally by what is
essentially a threshold strategy in the discrete setting, the only small crux
being that randomization may be needed if the k:th labeled card arrives
exactly at the threshold position.
Let ak(d) = i/d, where i is the smallest value for which fk(i) > 0 in
an optimal strategy for the (N, d)-card game as in Lemma 3.3. By playing
the restricted game using the threshold strategy given by a1(d), . . . , aN(d)
for large d, the selector will be able to achieve a winning probability in the
restricted game approaching that of the game (5) in the list.
If we regard a(d) = (a1(d), . . . , aN(d)) as a point in the N -dimensional
unit cube, then as d →∞, the points a(d) must have an aggregation point,
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and by continuity of the selector’s worst case expected payoff under a thresh-
old strategy as a function of the thresholds, the aggregation point must cor-
respond to an optimal strategy for the selector in the N -restricted game.
Therefore, to obtain an upper bound on the selector’s winning probability
in the last-arrival game, it suffices to establish an upper bound for threshold
strategies in the N -restricted game for some N .
3.4 Canonical thresholds
Suppose that for a fixed N and some number 0 < θ < 1, we try to con-
struct a threshold strategy that achieves a probability of success of at least
θ for every n ≤ N . Then there is a canonical way of recursively computing
thresholds a1, . . . , aN such that if any sequence of thresholds achieves winning
probability at least θ, then a1, . . . , aN does.
Suppose we have fixed a1, . . . , ak−1. Then if there is a value for ak that
gives probability at leat θ of success for n = k, then there is a maximal such
value of ak, and for that value of ak, the probability of success is exactly θ.
The choice of ak obviously does not affect the probability of success for
n < k. For n > k, the probability of success will increase with larger ak,
since a larger ak decreases the risk of accepting an item too early. Therefore
after fixing a1, . . . , ak−1, we might as well set ak to the unique value that
gives success probability exactly θ. If we do this consistently, starting with
a1 = 1−θ, then we will either get stuck at some point because not even ak = 0
gives winning probability θ for n = k, or we find a sequence of thresholds
that works.
For each k, the threshold ak (to the extent it can be defined) is a decreas-
ing function of θ, but does not depend on N . For each N there is a maximal
achievable success probability θN , characterized by aN = 0. The sequence
θN is decreasing with N , and therefore has a limit θopt as N →∞.
We can now establish the existence of an optimal strategy for the selector
in the last-arrival game.
Theorem 3.5. There is a threshold strategy which is optimal for the selector
in the last-arrival game.
Proof. For each θ > θopt there is some N for which θN < θ, which means
that success probability θ is impossible even in some restricted games. On
the other hand, for θ = θopt, the sequence ak of thresholds can be computed
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indefinitely without getting stuck, and therefore success probability θopt is
achievable with a threshold strategy in the last-arrival (unrestricted) game.
3.5 Optimal strategy for the devil
The fact that the devil has an optimal strategy does not seem to follow from
any “soft” argument. Conceivably the selector’s task could become more
difficult the larger the number of items. But we already have indications
that such a situation would entail θopt = 1/e. We will make this argument
precise, and therefore the first step towards proving the existence of an op-
timal strategy for the devil is to show that contrary to the “conclusion” of
the introduction, θopt is strictly smaller than 1/e. An independent proof of
this based on numerical calculation is given in Section 4.2.
Proposition 3.6.
θopt < 1/e.
Proof. Clearly it suffices to consider the selector’s optimal strategy. Let ak
be the thresholds for this strategy. First observe that ak → 1 as k → ∞.
The reason is that if ak is too small, the selector will accept too early when
n = k + 1. It follows that there are infinitely many records in the sequence,
by which we mean ak such that ak > ai for every i < k.
If ak is a record, then in order for the selector to succeed when n = k, there
must be exactly one item arriving after time ak. This shows that θopt ≤ 1/e,
and if θopt = 1/e, we must have ak = 1 − 1/k + o(1/k) whenever ak is a
record. Now let am and an be records for large m, n such that n ≥ 2m. Since
am = 1−1/m+o(1/m) and an = 1−1/n+o(1/n), there must be a record ak
for some k in the interval m < k ≤ n such that ak − ak−1 ≥ 1/k
2 − o(1/k2).
Now consider the winning probability for n = k. The probability of
exactly one item arriving in the interval [ak, 1] is maximized when ak = 1−1/k
and therefore cannot be greater than
(
1−
1
k
)k−1
= exp
(
(k − 1) log
(
1−
1
k
))
= e−1
(
1 +
1
2k
)
+O
(
1
k2
)
,
as k →∞, by the Taylor expansion of exp((1/x−1) log(1−x)) where x = 1/k.
Now condition on exactly one item arriving after time ak. Then the
strategy will still fail if there is an item arriving in the interval [ak−1, ak].
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The probability of this is at least 1/k− o(1/k). Hence the selector’s winning
probability for n = k is at most
e−1
(
1 +
1
2k
−
1
k
)
+ o
(
1
k
)
< e−1.
Theorem 3.7. The devil has an optimal strategy for the last-arrival game.
Proof. For every N , it follows by compactness of the set of strategies that
there is an optimal strategy for the devil in the N -restricted game. The
optimal strategy is simply a probability distribution on {1, . . . , N}. It is
easy to verify that if a sequence of optimal strategies for the N -restricted
games have an aggregation point in the total variation metric, then that
aggregation point must represent a strategy for the last-arrival game which
keeps the selector’s success probability to θopt, and which is therefore optimal
for the devil.
In order to prove the existence of such an aggregation point, it suffices, in
view of the principle of dominated convergence, to prove that for every ǫ > 0
there is a C such that no optimal strategy of any N -restricted game assigns
probability more than ǫ to the set of numbers {n : n > C}.
Obviously it suffices to find a C ′ such that only finitely many N -restricted
games have optimal strategies that give probability more than ǫ to {n : n >
C ′}, since we can then choose C beyond the largest of those values of N .
Therefore assume for a contradiction that there is some ǫ > 0 such that
for every C there are arbitrarily large N for which some optimal strategy in
the N -restricted game gives probability ǫ or more to {n > C}. This means
that, eliminating N from the argument and considering the last-arrival game,
for every C and every θ > θopt, the devil can find a strategy that assigns
probability at least ǫ to {n > C} and keeps the selector’s success probability
to at most θ.
We choose
θ = θopt +
ǫ
2
·
(
1
e
− θopt
)
.
By Proposition 3.6, θ > θopt. Now for every m0 and every δ > 0, we can find
an m ≥ m0 and a strategy for the devil that keeps the selector’s winning
probability below θ, and which assigns weight at most δ to {m+1, . . . , 2m},
and at least ǫ to {n : n > 2m}. Indeed, if we choose C ≥ m0 · 2
1/δ, then not
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all of the intervals m02
i < n ≤ m02
i+1 for i ≤ 1/δ can get weight more than
δ.
The idea is now to construct a strategy for the selector that “sacrifices”
the values of n in the interval m < n ≤ 2m, and in return obtains success
probability close to 1/e for all n > 2m. This is done by first observing the
number of items in the interval [0, 1/2] (here the number 1/2 is an arbitrary
number smaller than every threshold of the selector’s optimal strategy). Our
strategy will never guess that n is in the interval m < n ≤ 2m, and the first
step is to decide, based on the number of items arriving in [0, 1/2], between
the two options n ≤ m and n > 2m. Provided δ is small enough and m0
(and thereby m) is large enough, this decision can be made with an error
probability which is as small as we please.
If we find that n ≤ m, then we play normally, which means that con-
ditioning on n ≤ m we achieve a winning probability as close as we please
to θopt. If on the other hand we find that n > 2m, then we switch to the
strategy used in the proof of Proposition 2.1, namely to accept the first item
arriving after time 1 − 1/(2k), where k is the number of items observed in
[0, 1/2]. This gives the selector a conditional probability of success close to
1/e > θ in case n actually is larger than 2m.
In all, this means that we can construct a strategy for the selector which
achieves success probability as close as we please to
(1− ǫ) · θopt + ǫ ·
1
e
= θopt + ǫ ·
(
1
e
− θopt
)
> θ,
a contradiction.
4 Computing θopt
In this section we show how we have computed numerically the probability
θopt of success for the selector with the optimal strategy, while providing the
Maple code that was used. We obtain the bounds
0.3529170002071955 < θopt < 0.3529170002071958.
4.1 The P -polynomials
We already described the idea of prescribing a value for θ, which recursively
defines thresholds that achieve success probability θ for the selector, if pos-
11
sible. Here we show how to actually compute these thresholds numerically.
The calculations turn out to involve certain polynomials which we describe
first.
Let [n] = {1, . . . , n}. We define the polynomial Pn in the variables
x1, . . . , xn by
Pn =
∑
f
xf(1)xf(2) · · ·xf(n).
where the sum is taken over all f : [n]→ [n] such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,∣∣f−1 ([i])∣∣ ≥ i.
In other words, a monomial is present in the sum if and only if x1 occurs at
least once, x1 and x2 together occur at least twice etc.
We have P0 = 1, P1 = x1, P2 = x
2
1 + 2x1x2, P3 = x
3
1 + 3x
2
1x2 + 3x
2
1x3 +
3x1x
2
2 + 6x1x2x3, etc. In general, the number of terms is equal to the n:th
Catalan number, and the sum of the coefficients is equal to (n+1)n−1. These
polynomials are related to parking functions, trees etc, for which there is an
extensive combinatorial theory.
The polynomials Pn are calculated for n ≤ N (here we have takenN = 20)
using the Maple code:
N:=20;
P[0]:=1:
for n to N do
P[n]:=
add(binomial(n, n-i)*x[1]^(n-i)*eval(P[i],
{x[1]=add(x[k], k=2..n-i+1), seq(x[j]=x[j+n-i], j=2..i)}),
i=0..n-1):
od:
We must avoid using the command simplify on Pn, since that will make
each polynomial roughly four times the size (in terms of memory) of the
previous one, instead of twice.
If xi are the lengths of disjoint subintervals Ii of the unit interval, then
Pn is the probability that of n independent uniformly chosen points, at least
one lies in I1, at least two in I1 ∪ I2, at least three in I1 ∪ I2 ∪ I3 etc.
We can see how this relates to the last-arrival problem if we assume that
we have fixed the thresholds a1, . . . , an for a strategy, and we ask for the
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probability of not accepting any item if there are n items. If we have
a1 ≤ a2 ≤ · · · ≤ an,
then not accepting any item is equivalent to having at least one item appear-
ing before time a1, at least two before a2 etc, which has probability
Pn(a1, a2 − a1, . . . , an − an−1).
To cover also the case that the ai’s are not increasing, we let
αi,n = min
i≤j≤n
aj .
Then α1,n ≤ α2,n ≤ · · · ≤ αn,n, and not accepting any of n items is equivalent
to having at least i items appear before time αi,n for every i, and therefore
has probability
Pn(α1,n, α2,n − α1,n, . . . , αn,n − αn−1,n).
Suppose we fix a number θ. Then we can recursively obtain upper bounds
bi on the thresholds ai for a strategy that achieves success probability at least
θ. First we let b1 = 1 − θ. This is easily seen to be an upper bound on a1
by choosing n = 1. Next we consider n = 2 and derive an upper bound on
a2. We label a particular item and estimate the probability of success for the
selector by n times the probability that the labeled item is the last one to
arrive and is accepted (and no earlier item is accepted).
For n = 2 we obtain
P (success) ≤ 2 · (1− a2) · a1. (2)
Success (with the labeled item) requires that (a) the labeled item arrives
after time a2 and (b) that the other item arrives before time a1. Notice that
we do not necessarily have equality: If a2 < a1 then the labeled item need
not be accepted even if (a) and (b) both hold. From (2) it follows that
a2 ≤ 1−
P (success)
2a1
.
If now P (success) ≥ θ and a1 ≤ b1 it follows that
a2 ≤ 1−
θ
2b1
,
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so we can take b2 = 1− θ/(2b1). In general we have
P (success) ≤ n·(1−an)·Pn−1(α1,n−1, α2,n−1−α1,n−1, . . . , αn−1,n−1−αn−2,n−1).
Suppose now that we have established upper bounds bi on ai, and from
them similarly define
βi,n = min
i≤j≤n
bj .
Then
θ ≤ P (success)
≤ n(1− an) · Pn−1(α1,n−1, α2,n−1 − α1,n−1, . . . , αn−1,n−1 − αn−2,n−1)
≤ n(1− an) · Pn−1(β1,n−1, β2,n−1 − β1,n−1, . . . , βn−1,n−1 − βn−2,n−1), (3)
and therefore
an ≤ 1−
θ
n · Pn−1(β1,n−1, β2,n−1 − β1,n−1, . . . , βn−1,n−1 − βn−2,n−1)
.
If we recursively define
bn = 1−
θ
n · Pn−1(β1,n−1, β2,n−1 − β1,n−1, . . . , βn−1,n−1 − βn−2,n−1)
,
then for every strategy that achieves success probability θ we must have
ak ≤ bk for every k.
When we actually compute the bounds bk, it is easiest to work with only
one sequence of β’s that are continuously updated. Each round of computing
a new bn is as follows:
βn := 1−
θ
n · Pn−1(β1, β2 − β1, . . . , βn−1 − βn−2)
,
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1,
βi := min(βi, βn).
bn := βn.
The Maple code is (here with the choice θ = 1/e):
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theta:=evalf(exp(-1));
beta[0]:=0:
for n to N+1 do
beta[n]:=1-theta/n/eval(P[n-1],
{seq(x[i]=beta[i]-beta[i-1], i=1..n-1)}):
b[n]:=beta[n]:
print(n, b[n]):
for i to n-1 do
if beta[i]>b[n] then beta[i]:=b[n]: fi:
od:
od:
4.2 Upper bound smaller than 1/e
If we start from the ansatz θ = 1/e, we get the upper bounds
b1 = 0.632120558828558
b2 = 0.709011646565337
b3 = 0.753159994034917
b4 = 0.781938205897688
b5 = 0.801087317290966
b6 = 0.812758005512094
b7 = 0.816930118314804
b8 = 0.810454956408292
b9 = 0.780396988248096
b10 = 0.657338420431837
b11 = −1.22035626433979
Here b11 is negative, and since no strategy can have a11 < 0, the conclusion
is that no strategy for the selector can achieve winning probability 1/e for
all n. In fact the conclusion is slightly stronger: Even in the restricted game
for N = 11, there is no way the selector can win with probability at least
1/e. Therefore we have an alternative proof of Proposition 3.6.
As long as the bi’s are increasing, we actually obtain a strategy that wins
with the desired probability, so we also see that if the devil is restricted to
1 ≤ n ≤ 7, the selector can in fact obtain winning probability 1/e.
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A little experimentation shows that for θ = 0.35, the selector doesn’t
seem to be in trouble, while the slightly larger θ = 0.355 leads to b20 < 0.
It also seems that as soon as the bi ’s start decreasing, they enter a losing
spiral that quickly leads to a negative value.
4.3 Refinement
To obtain a more precise upper bound on θopt, we would like to extend the
computation of the bi’s to i > 20. With the method described so far, the
problem is that the polynomials Pn grow exponentially in terms of computer
memory, preventing us to go much further than to n = 25. Therefore we will
use an estimate based on the polynomials P1, . . . , PN for a fixed N , where in
practice we have taken N = 24. We write αi for αi,n−1 to make the equation
readable:
P (success) ≤ n(1− an)
·
N∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
αn−1−in−N−1 · Pi(αn−i− αn−N−1, αn−i+1− αn−i, . . . , αn−1−αn−2).
(4)
The explanation is straightforward: Suppose that one of the n items
is labeled. The probability of success is n times the probability that the
labeled item is last and is accepted. Success with the labeled item requires
that item to appear in the interval [an, 1]. Moreover, for some i with 0 ≤
i ≤ N , we must have exactly i items appearing after time αn−N−1,n−1. Of
those, at least one must appear in [αn−N−1,n−1, αn−i,n−1], at least two in
[αn−N−1,n−1, αn−i+1,n−1] etc.
We can use (4) to compute upper bounds bn in the same way as before.
The Maple code is:
for n from N+2 to 1000 do
beta[n]:=1 - theta/n/add(binomial(n-1,i)*beta[n-N-1]^(n-1-i)
*eval(P[i], {x[1] = beta[n-i] - beta[n-N-1],
seq(x[j] = beta[n-i-1+j] - beta[n-i-2+j], j=2..i)}), i=0..N):
b[n]:=beta[n]:
print(n, b[n]):
for i to n-1 do
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if beta[i]>b[n] then beta[i]:=b[n]: fi:
od:
od:
With N = 24 and θ = 0.3529170002071958 this gives b147 < 0. Therefore
θopt < 0.3529170002071958. (5)
4.4 Lower bound
So far we have not established any explicit lower bound on the selector’s prob-
ability of success, although it seems that our upper bound is quite sharp. In
this section we construct a threshold strategy for the selector that guarantees
winning probability close to the upper bound (5). We restrict our attention
to strategies for which the sequence of thresholds ak is nondecreasing. Again
we start from an ansatz for θ. For n ≤ N + 1, we compute the sequence by
an = 1−
θ
nPn−1(a1, a2 − a1, . . . , an−1 − an−2)
. (6)
To extend the computations we now need a lower bound on the probability
of success for the selector. Since we will require the sequence of ai’s to be
increasing, we do not have to bother with introducing the α’s and β’s.
Proposition 4.1.
P (success)
n
≥ (1− an)
·
N∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
an−1−in−N−1 · Pi(an−i − an−N−1, an−i+1 − an−i, . . . , an−1 − an−2)
·
(
1−
n−1−i∑
k=N+2−i
(
n− 1− i
k
)(
1−
an−i−k
an−N−1
)k)
. (7)
Proof. Success with a labeled item is equivalent to the following conditions
being satisfied:
1. The labeled item appears in [an, 1].
2. For some i with 0 ≤ i ≤ N , there appears exactly i items in the interval
[an−N−1, an−1], and the remaining n− 1− i appear before an−N−1.
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3. Of the i items in the interval [an−N−1, an−1], at least one arrives in the
interval [an−N−1, an−i], at least two in the interval [an−N−1, an−i+1] etc.
4. For the n − 1 − i items that arrive before an−N−1, there is no subset
of k items for N + 2 − i ≤ k ≤ n − 1 − i that arrive in the interval
[an−i−k, an−N−1].
Condition 1 corresponds to the factor (1−an), condition 2 to the sum where
i goes from 0 to N , condition 3 to the occurrence of Pi, and condition 4 to
the last factor in the summand. That last factor is where in general we do
not have equality.
For “intermediate” n, we use the recursion
an =
1−
θ
n
∑N
i=0
(
n−1
i
)
an−1−in−N−1
(
1−
∑n−1−i
k=N+2−i
(
n−1−i
k
) (
1−
an−i−k
an−N−1
)k)
· Pi
, (8)
where Pi is evaluated with the arguments as in (7). The Maple code is
for n from N+2 to 1000 do
a[n]:=1 - theta/n/add(binomial(n-1, i)*a[n-N-1]^(n-1-i)*
(1 - add(binomial(n-1-i,k)*(1-a[n-i-k]/a[n-N-1])^k,
k=N+2-i..n-1-i))*
eval(P[i], {x[1] = a[n-i] - a[n-N-1],
seq(x[j] = a[n-i-1+j] - a[n-i-2+j], j=2..i)}), i=0..N):
print(n, a[n]):
if a[n]<a[n-1] then print("Darn!"): fi:
od:
With N = 24, this seems to work for θ = 0.3529170002071955. Next we
turn to proving rigorously that the strategy works for all n.
4.5 Construction of a strategy
We describe a scheme for proving that a certain sequence ak gives winning
probability at least θ. Our sequences will be of the following form: For some
m, the numbers a1, . . . , am − 1 are given by a specific list, and for k ≥ m,
ak = 1−
1
k
.
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We have taken θ = 0.3529170002071955. If we compute an according to
the previous section, we notice an interesting phenomenon. The quantity
n(1−an) is at first increasing, and seems to stabilize at around 1.29. Then for
n at around 130 to 160, it suddenly drops to around 0.74 where it stabilizes.
This phenomenon can be understood at least intuitively. For large n,
the most important factor for success is that exactly one item must arrive
after an. If the probability of success is exactly θ, this confines an to a short
interval around one of the points 1 − x1/n and 1 − x2/n, where x1 and x2
are the two solutions to xe−x = θ, unless some other reason for failure has
unusually large probability. The second most important reason for failure is
if an item arrives between an−1 and an. This means that the sequence an can
take large steps if it is on the hill between 1−x1/n and 1−x2/n. The strategy
is in danger of failure as long as an ≈ 1− 1.29/n, but if it manages to climb
the hill at 1− 1/n it will reach security and stabilize at an ≈ 1− 0.74/n.
The first time an > 1−1/n is at n = 147 and we therefore take m = 147.
In other words, we construct a sequence an by (6) for n ≤ 25, by (8) for
26 ≤ n ≤ 146, and by an = 1 − 1/n for n ≥ 147. In computer language we
overwrite the old values of an for n ≥ 147:
for n from 147 to 1000 do
a[n]:=1-1/n:
od:
We have used (7) to verify that with this sequence, the probability of
success is at least θ for n ≤ 750.
4.6 Proving a lower bound on θopt
Our next task is to prove that the constructed strategy wins with probability
at least θ also for large n. Success requires that exactly one item arrives after
time an. We start by estimating the probability of this.
Lemma 4.2. The probability of exactly one item appearing after time an is
at least 1/e.
Proof. We estimate it by
n(1− an)a
n−1
n =
(
1−
1
n
)n−1
> 1/e.
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In the following we condition on exactly one item after time an. With a
rough estimate, the (conditional) probability that there are at least k (out
of n− 1) items arriving in the interval [an−k, an] is at most(
n− 1
k
)(
1−
an−k
an
)k
.
Conditioning on exactly one item arriving after time an, the failure proba-
bility is therefore bounded by
n−1∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k
)(
1−
an−k
an
)k
. (9)
It remains to bound (9), which naturally we do in two steps. We begin
with the terms for which an−k is given by 1 − 1/(n− k). Recall that this is
when n− k ≥ m and that in the specific case we have in mind, m = 147.
Lemma 4.3. For n > m, we have
n−m∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k
)(
1−
an−k
an
)k
≤
e+ 1
n− 2
. (10)
Proof. For n− k ≥ m we have
1−
an−k
an
= 1−
1− 1
n−k
1− 1
n
=
k
(n− k)(n− 1)
.
By an elementary integral estimate,
kk
k!
≤ ek−1
for every k. Therefore
n−m∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k
)(
1−
an−k
an
)k
≤ e−1
n−m∑
k=1
(
e
n− k
)k
. (11)
Differentiating the expression (
e
n− k
)k
(12)
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twice with respect to k gives(
e
n− k
)k (
log
(
e
n− k
)
+
k
n− k
)2
+
(
e
n− k
)k (
2
n− k
+
k
(n− k)2
)
,
(13)
which is obviously nonnegative. Hence (12) is convex regarded as a function
of k. Therefore whenever
e2
(n− 2)2
≥
( e
m
)n−m
, (14)
that is, when the first term is at least as large as the last term, we have
e−1
n−m∑
k=1
(
e
n− k
)k
≤
1
n− 1
+ (n−m− 1) ·
e
(n− 2)2
.
Since
(n− 2)2
( e
m
)n
decreases whenever
n− 2 ≥
2
− log
(
e
m
) ,
it suffices to find a single value of n for which (14) is valid, and obviously
equality holds when n = m+ 2.
Consequently
n−m∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k
)(
1−
an−k
an
)k
≤
1
n− 1
+
e · (n−m− 1)
(n− 2)2
which in turn is
≤
1
n− 2
+
e · (n− 2)
(n− 2)2
=
e+ 1
n− 2
.
It is easy to check that this holds also when n = m+1. The bound (10) now
follows.
The part of the sum in (9) for which k > n−m is estimated by (assuming
that n ≥ 2m− 3)
n−1∑
k=n−m+1
(
n− 1
k
)(
1−
an−k
an
)k
≤
n−1∑
k=n−m+1
(
n− 1
m− 2
)
(1− a1)
k
≤ (m− 1) ·
nm−2
(m− 2)!
· (1− a1)
n−m+1, (15)
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which is decreasing for n ≥ 2m, since
n ≥
m− 2
− log(1− a1)
.
In our case it is smaller than 10−100.
Putting together these pieces, we obtain
P (success) ≥ e−1 ·
(
1−
e+ 1
n− 2
− 10−100
)
,
which clearly is larger than our choice of θ whenever n > 750 (actually much
earlier). We conclude that, with reservation for purely numerical errors,
0.3529170002071955 < θopt < 0.3529170002071958.
5 The secretary problem for a partially or-
dered set
The original motivation for considering the last-arrival problem was the secre-
tary problem for a partially ordered set. The items (secretaries) are partially
ordered and presented in random order to a selector, whose objective is to
choose online a maximal element of the partial order. J. Preater [6] showed
that there is a strategy that achieves this with probability 1/8, and this was
improved to 1/4 by N. Georgiou, M. Kuchta, M. Morayne and J. Niemiec [4]
and further to 1/4 + ǫ by J. Kozik [5]. Recently R. Freij and the author [3]
found a strategy that achieves success probability 1/e, thereby matching the
upper bound from the classical secretary problem.
Before finding the solution in [3], the analysis of several reasonable strate-
gies showed that with decent probability they tend to accept the last maximal
element to arrive. An idea was to consider a maximal element x of the partial
order, and to condition on all other maximal element arriving before x. As is
shown below, this type of argument is strong enough to establish a nonzero
probability of success in the partially ordered secretary problem.
Naturally this led to the conjecture that the correct generalization of the
strategy for the classical secretary problem would turn out to accept the last
maximal element of the partial order with probability at least 1/e. For this
conjecture it was natural to first consider a completely “unordered” set, and
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this is precisely the last-arrival problem. After some confusion, as described
in the introduction, the conjecture turned out to be false, and therefore an
analysis focusing only on the last arriving maximal element cannot establish
winning probability 1/e for the partially ordered secretary problem.
Nevertheless, it turns out that there is a strategy that works for an arbi-
trary partial order, and with probability uniformly bounded away from zero
picks the last maximal element. The strategy builds on a strategy for the
last-arrival problem, and uses the following result.
Lemma 5.1. There is a threshold strategy for the last-arrival problem which
accepts the last item with probability at least θ1 > 0, and with probability at
least θ2 > 0 does not accept any item.
We have proved the first part of the statement in detail, and it is clear that
the optimal strategy must also satisfy the second part (so does the strategy
described in Proposition 2.1, but it is not a threshold strategy).
We now apply the following strategy for the partially ordered secretary
problem: Accept an element if (1) it is maximal in the induced partial order
of elements seen so far, and (2) arrives at a time later than ak, where k is
the number of maximal elements in that induced partial order.
Proposition 5.2. This strategy for the partially ordered secretary problem
that with probability at least θ1θ2 > 0 picks the last maximal element.
Proof. We condition on the number m of maximal elements in the partial
order, and the number q of elements that are dominated only by the last
maximal element x to arrive. We condition on x arriving in the time interval
[am, 1]. The probability for this is at least θ1.
With probability at least θ2, the m+q−1 maximal elements in the partial
order P − x will arrive early enough to guarantee that none of them, and
thereby no element at all, is accepted before x arrives (we have conditioned
on the m− 1 remaining maximal elements arriving before x arrives, but this
only increases the probability of success).
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